This global increase in women's representation is encouraging; however, it is problematic for at least two reasons. First, while we have seen an increasing level of women's representation, we can by no means conclude that we have reached gender parity in the world's democratic institutions. The fact that, in 2009, the average level of women's representation in legislatures was 18 percent is laudable only given the historic underrepresentation of women in such bodies. Second, this global increase in women's representation masks the significant variation among different democratic political systems. In December 2009, women made up 56.3 percent of the members of Rwanda's legislature, while for the U.S. Congress the figure was only 16.8 percent (InterParliamentary Union 2009 ). Other consolidated democracies maintained similarly weak levels of women's representation (Japan's Diet, for example, is 11.3 percent female), whereas some new democracies feature significantly higher levels of female membership (South Africa's African National Congress is 44.5 percent female, and Mexico's Congress is 28.2 percent female). Related differences in the level of women's representation among executives, judges, and members of political parties are apparent.
Explanations for this variation among countries, in particular in the area of women's legislative representation, have focused on several key factors. For some researchers, differences in political culture are the reason (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003) . Put simply, the cultures of some countries place a higher value on gender equality, which translates into greater women's rep- Women's Representation, 1945 -2006 resentation. Other observers highlight the role of economic factors, in particular women's labor force participation (e.g., Norris 1985; Rule 1987) . The presence of more women in the workforce translates into greater women's mobilization, creating a more positive atmosphere for increasing women's representation. In addition, many scholars focus on the effects of political institutions, in particular electoral systems and gender quotas (e.g., Kittilson 2006; Matland 1993; Salmond 2006) .
While the existing work forms a solid foundation for understanding women's representation, we contend that the existing research suffers from two limitations. First, the literature within political science and social movements tends to examine the participation of women in political institutions using discrete examples. Studies of participation examine either participation in the institutions of a single country or region (see, e.g,, Kittilson 2006; Norris 1985; Siaroff 2000) or the participation of women in a single institution across a number of countries (see, e.g., Caul 1999 (see, e.g., Caul , 2001 McDonagh 2002) . This approach leaves our understanding of women's participation in political life incomplete. While political science knows a great deal about women's participation in regions such as Latin America, we are at a loss to explain how those models of representation extend to other regions of the world.
Second, the existing literature tends to focus on specific forms of women's representation, such as the number of women in the legislature or the executive, without examining how representation in one form may impact representation in others. For us, the trends presented in Figure 1 .1 raise an interesting question -are the across-the-board increases in women's representation interrelated? Put another way, we seek to understand whether women's legislative representation in any way explains the increases in women's representation in other areas. By simply examining the data, we can see that the general increase in women's legislative representation predates the increase in other areas of representation. However, there are no empirical studies that can definitively answer whether the increasing level of women's legislative representation explains, in part, the increases in other areas or whether the adoption of a quota or the election of a female executive affects women's representation in other areas.
This book attempts to answer these questions. Quite simply, we argue that women's representation in one area or institution does, in fact, affect women's representation in other areas. One major limitation of the existing literature is that there is no unifying theory to explain the variation we see across institutions, time, and region. While we ourselves have not found a completely satisfactory solution to this problem, we propose a theory that we believe pushes the field in this direction. We argue that, in order to understand the diversity of women's representation, one must consider the influence of women's participation in one democratic institution on another. We refer to this process as contagion. Using our dataset of 159 democratic countries for the years 1945 -2006, we demonstrate that the level of women's representation in one institution impacts the level of women's representation in others. By using a dataset that covers democracies across the globe, we show that contagion is not simply an artifact of one region or country. While we highlight important regional differences, our research shows that contagion exists even when we control for these regional differences.
Explaining Women's Representation
Before adding our understanding of contagion, we must first examine the existing literature for the factors known to influence women's representation. We find several causal factors that determine the level of women's representation. The participation of women in public life, including the labor force, is a consistent influence on women's representation, giving women both the tools and the distinct preferences necessary for participation ( It is not just women's participation in the labor force by itself that can influence women's representation in politics. Some professions may be more likely to produce female political aspirants than others (Lawless and Fox 2005; Matland 2006b; Matland and Studlar 1998; Williams 2008) . The type of profession in which one works can influence a political candidate's ability to gather resources for political office, including campaign donations and political connections that can be crucial to increasing the number of women in office (Carroll 1994; Lawless and Fox 2005; Williams 2008) . The extent to which women participate in feeder occupations is an important consideration for studies of women's representation, as is the presence of women in lower-level offices.
In thinking about the factors known to influence women's political participation, it is important to understand how these factors may vary over time. Cultural shifts in support for the representation of women in politics, for example, are an influence on women's representation, one that is best captured over time. Support for women's representation has been measured in a number of ways, including surveys on support for female executives and measures of the number of years since the first female was elected to office ( Past studies include such measures to tap the support for women in office (the former) as well as the extent to which there is a tradition of women's participation in public life (the latter), both of which are manifestations of a culture supportive of women in office. If such factors were not examined over time, it would be impossible to discern whether a threshold of support was necessary to achieve women's representation and risk eliminating countries on the cusp of producing female leaders -countries that could potentially enrich our understanding of representation if studied early enough.
In addition to the importance of support for women qua women, there are other cultural factors worthy of exploration. Support for female candidates may increase with specific political conditions, especially the history of corruption within a country (Baldez 2004; Escobar-Lemmon and TaylorRobinson 2005; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Jalalzai 2008; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Valdini 2005) . To the extent that women are viewed as political outsiders, free of corruption, they may gather greater support for their candidacies within a country. Similarly, the ideology of the country and its emphasis on rights more generally also play a role in understanding representation, with left-leaning countries more likely to see women in power (Caul 1999; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jalalzai 2008; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; McDonagh 2002; Siaroff 2000) . Related to the importance of ideology is the religiosity of a country, both in terms of the denomination and frequency of attendance at religious services (Inglehart and Norris 2003) .
Differences in economic and cultural traditions certainly matter. Yet, previous research also clearly demonstrates that political institutions matter by creating different incentives for political actors to foster women's representation. Electoral rules take many forms, including the differences between popular and appointive systems (Jalalzai 2008; Slotnick 1984) ; another influence is whether there are single-member or multimember districts (Caul 1999 (Caul , 2001 Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Htun and Jones 2002; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Matland and Studlar 1996, 1998; McDonagh 2002; Norris 2004 Norris , 2006 Rincker n.d.; Salmond 2006; Siaroff 2000; and Vengroff, Nyiri, and Fugiero 2003) . The greater the opportunities for parties to balance their ticket, the more successful women are at attaining political office. Higher district magnitude tends to favor greater representation by women (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Lakeman 1976; Matland 1993 Matland , 1998 Matland and Studlar 1996; Norris 1985; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987; Salmond 2006; Thames and Williams 2010) ; in addition, more generally, the more seats up for election, the better women fare in elections (Matland and Studlar 1996; Welch and Studlar 1990) . This is especially true for proportional-representation systems, where the advantages of incumbency are less important than in single-member systems (Matland 1993; Matland and Brown 1992; Studlar and McAllister 1991; Welch and Studlar 1996) . The existence of a greater number of viable political parties increases the chances for women's participation (Matland and Studlar 1996) , not only within left-wing parties that are more sympathetic to women, because the success of these parties encourages other parties to diversify to gain a larger percentage of the vote (Reynolds 1999) .
A final factor that may influence women's representation within political institutions is the amount of power the institution and the individuals within it wield. There is some evidence that women are more likely to hold lowerlevel offices, which tend to be less powerful across the branches of government (Anasagasti and Wuiame 1999; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Jalalzai 2008; Matland and Studlar 1998) . To the extent that power is shared within an institution, such as in systems with both a president and a prime minister or on courts with a large number of judges, we should expect to see more women in power.
The Case for Contagion
Given the influence of so many factors on women's representation, one might wonder how contagion could improve upon what we already know. There are three main reasons why studying contagion may offer insight into our understanding of women's representation. The first, and most obvious, justification for considering contagion is that, as the group selecting mem-bers of the institution becomes more diverse, so should the institution. For example, in electoral systems where legislators are chosen through a proportional-representation list system, as the parties making the candidate list become more diverse, so should the legislature. Not only will there be more women with the political experience necessary to be an effective member of the legislature, but also more women within the party will push the party to put forward women for office or to adopt quotas (Baldez 2004; Caul 1999 Caul , 2001 Krook 2006a; Matland 2006b; Matland and Studlar 1996) . Quotas can further increase the number of women in legislatures, creating an indirect contagion effect that diversifies other institutions. Similarly, as women gain political experience in the legislature, they become likely choices for cabinetlevel positions (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor In addition to the influence of the diversity of the selector on the diversity of political institutions, contagion theory also suggests that as one political institution becomes more diverse, the perceived risk of diversifying other institutions is lessened. As leftist parties began putting female candidates forward or adopting quotas, other parties became increasingly likely to follow suit. Both the public and members of other political institutions saw that there were no negative consequences for diversifying, making them more willing to diversify themselves (Baldez 2004; Caul 2001; Krook 2006b; Matland 2006a; Matland and Studlar 1996) . The larger the political institution (or the greater number of seats), the lower the risk of diversifying (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Lakeman 1976; Matland 1993 Matland , 1998 Salmond 2006) . Thus, diversity in one institution should spill over into others, as political actors see few if any negative consequences for diversifying.
Finally, the diversification of one institution may influence diversity in another as institutions compete within a country for a finite amount of power. Past research demonstrates that more diverse institutions are seen as more legitimate by the masses, especially political minorities (Phillip 1995; Pitkin 1972; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005) . As institutions attempt to advance their policy objectives, the legitimacy of the institution plays a key role in winning public support (Easton 1965 (Easton , 1979 Norris 1997) . Indeed, for institutions such as cabinets and the judiciary, which are not democratically elected, legitimacy may be crucial to winning adherence to their policies or decisions. Thus by bringing formerly unrepresented groups into the political fold, institutions not only gain an electoral edge but also gain advantage over other institutions as they move toward their policy goals. The ability to appeal to a wider swath of the electorate and the greater political efficacy people attach to more diverse institutions will make it easier for institutions in competition over the policy space to achieve their policy goals. This is especially important because these political minorities may view policy differently from those in the majority (Wenzel, Bowler, and Lanoue 2000) .
The importance of understanding the influence of women's representation in one institution on other institutions is grounded in the importance of understanding representation generally. As more diverse interests are brought into the public domain, political minorities' ability to achieve new policy goals is dependent on the diffusion of political power across institutions. However, in most countries, it takes the work of more than one political institution to achieve these policy goals. The more diverse all political institutions are, the more support new policies will receive from these institutions, and the more likely these policy goals will be achieved.
The influence of contagion does not end with considering the number of women serving in other political institutions, however. These institutions become diverse because of the adoption of quota laws, both voluntary and compulsory. Quota laws are perhaps the single most important institutional mechanism affecting women's representation. The type of quota within a country can vary significantly, from reserved seats within an institution to targets where party compliance is either voluntary or mandatory, and can significantly influence women's representation, though the effect on women's representation may be unintentional (Anasagasti and Wuiame 1999; Baldez 2004; Caul 1999 Caul , 2001 Htun and Jones 2002; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Jalalzai 2008; Kittilson 2006; Krook 2006a Krook , 2006b Matland 2006a Matland , 2006b Norris 2004 Norris , 2006 Williams and Thames 2008) . The greater the costs of noncompliance with quotas, the greater the impact the quota has on the number of women in office. The availability of sanctions for noncompliance with quotas is important because the real motivation for creating a target for women's presence may be not to increase the number of women within the institution but instead to gain an electoral advantage for the party without any real intention of compliance (Krook 2006a (Krook , 2006b ). Thus, parties that prompt other parties to adopt quotas create a form of contagion (see, e.g., Caul 2001). Of course, the need for quotas within some institutions is still a matter of considerable debate and one about which women and men within the institution continue to have different views (Anasagasti and Wuiame 1999). Nonetheless, the indirect effect of quotas on diversifying institutions other than the parties or legislatures is worthy of consideration.
Other scholars have addressed contagion. Matland and Studlar (1996) argue that party leaders and even district-level constituency committees can feel pressure to nominate more female candidates as other political parties do so. There is also evidence that elites adopt gender quotas in response to decisions by other parties (Caul 2001; Meier 2004) or countries (Gray 2003; Powley 2005) . Still other studies consider the influence of one institution on another (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Jalalzai 2008 ). Yet, these studies tend to focus on contagion as a process that operates within one, narrow institution or form. We argue that contagion is much broader than diffusion through competition or regional proximity.
In this book, we focus on contagion from three sources -the level of women's legislative representation, the presence of a female chief executive, and the presence of gender quotas. As institutions such as the legislature or the executive become more diverse by the inclusion of women, we expect this diversity to impact women's representation in other areas. In addition, as individual parties or nations adopt quotas, we expect the commitment to gender equality to impact other institutions, as well. We test the impact of these contagion sources on women's legislative representation, the election of female chief executives, the selection of female judges to high courts, the adoption of voluntary party quotas, and the adoption of national quotas, both compulsory party quotas and reserved-seat quotas. If our contagion argument is correct, we expect these sources of contagion to impact women's representation in these areas.
Cases
For this project, we created a dataset with information on 159 democratic countries for the years 1945 -2006. Table 1 .1 lists the countries included in this analysis. They are all democracies, a function of two factors: democratic countries represented a substantial majority of all countries during this time period and offered women the greatest opportunity for political participation.1 We used both Polity IV (2008) and Freedom House (2007) rankings to determine whether countries were democracies. We included all country years for those countries that achieved at least a score of six on the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV Project (2004) or were designated at least "partially free" by Freedom House (2007). While we begin each chapter with 159 Kittilson 2006; Krook 2005 Krook , 2007b Krook , 2009 . Data on female executives were gathered from the Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership (2009) and from Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) . Both the number of women serving on high courts and the characteristics of the court were gathered from court websites and through communication between the authors and the Ministries of Justice.
Given the lengthy time frame as well as the number of countries in our dataset, the best way to consider representation and the potential for contagion to explain representation is with a time-series, cross-sectional design (Hughes and Paxton 2008; Salmond 2006) . The justification for the breadth of our project comes from the literature on women's representation itself. Past studies are replete with examples of how temporal and cross-national characteristics can serve to influence women's representation, while few examples consider both.
The importance of the design comes from the effects of time and space separately. The effect of time is the easiest to explain: women did not participate in politics in substantial numbers until the 1970s. Over time, however, the number of women in political institutions of all types has increased substantially (Hughes and Paxton 2008; Jalalzai 2008) . In part, this is driven by two factors. First is the effect of term length and incumbency; the number of women in government at time (t) is a function of the number of women at time (t-1). Thus, we know that the number of women in political institutions at any point in time is a function of the number of women serving in years prior (Hughes and Paxton 2008; Jalalzai 2008) . A second factor is the effect of descriptive representation; women serving in the past become role models for future female political aspirants (Lawless and Fox 2005; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007) . Unless there are women to break down the barriers of political institutions, women are less likely to run for office in the future (Carroll 1994; Hughes and Paxton 2008; Jalalzai 2008; Lawless and Fox 2005) . Thus, looking at women's participation over time is an essential component of understanding women's representation.
Studying representation over time also allows us to better understand the effects of cross-national influences on women's representation. The literature on representation focuses on the influence of institutional rules, country demographics, and culture as explanations for the participation of women in public life. These cross-national factors known to influence women's representation may change over time within a country, affecting women's representation in a way cross-sectional studies alone are not able to capture. It is therefore important to consider each of these explanations both discretely within a particular year and over time. The literature on cross-national influences, as we note later, has begun to consider the importance of how these factors change over time and the influence of this on representation.
Chapter Outline
To understand contagion, as well as the other factors known to influence women's representation, we examine four areas: the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and quotas, both party and national gender quotas. In chapter 2, we examine factors that explain women's representation in the legislature. The extant literature on women's participation tends to focus on the legislature, providing a rich grounding for our own work. We expect that women's legislative representation is at the heart of the contagion effect and will be strongly correlated with increased women's representation in other areas.
Chapter 3 focuses on those factors that explain the election of female chief executives. While some literature exists that examines women in cabinets, little work, to our knowledge, directly addresses women as chief executives (for exceptions, see Jalazai 2008 and McDonagh 2002) . Using an original data set of women chief executives, we show not only how social, cultural, and economic factors affect the likelihood of women being elected but also how women's representation in other institutions affects this likelihood.
In chapter 4, we examine the question of women's representation on courts. Courts are the last area where women have made inroads. The slow movement to the courts is often the result of a number of factors. First, many of these courts are new, so the opportunity for women to participate has been more limited historically. Second, the training and service requirements for those courts can limit women's access; women may not have had adequate experience in the public arena to win appointment. Finally, because the selection of judges typically requires the cooperation of two institutions, the need to diversify two bodies rather than one has slowed women's progress (Williams and Thames 2008) . Nonetheless, we look at the role of women's participation outside the judiciary to understand the diversity on a country's high court.
We also analyze the adoption of both voluntary party quotas and national gender quotas. In chapter 5, we take on voluntary party quotas and show how the contagion effect can explain the adoption of these quotas. In chapter 6, we examine two types of national quotas -compulsory party quotas, which require parties to nominate a certain percentage of female candidates, and reserved-seat quotas, which designate a certain proportion of seats for female legislators. Here we examine how contagion impacts the adoption of both types. Moreover, we explore the differences in types of quotas and their adoption, an aspect of women's representation that has not yet been considered by the literature.
Finally, in chapter 7, we conclude by assessing the merits of our contagion argument. We present not only its successes but also its limitations. We also address the implications of our argument for the wider study of gender and representation.
Conclusion
Our project considers the variation in women's paths to participation in public institutions, where that path is open, where it is not, and what accounts for the differences in women's access. To that end, we consider the representation of women in political institutions over the past six decades, controlling for the factors that might affect representation within a single institution while also accounting for the contagion effect, or how the representation in one institution may influence another. The political institutions we consider include legislatures, cabinets, courts, and quota laws. By looking crossnationally, cross-institutionally, and across time, we can gain a more complete perspective on women's representation. The breadth of this book offers a lot of opportunities for generalization, especially as countries consider alternate constitutional arrangements. As detailed later, the book explores the representation of women within institutions first and then builds to integrate a theoretical understanding of how women in one branch of government influence the representation of women in other institutions.
